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DUTY TO RECEIVE NATIONALS?
CLEMENS HUFMANN*
A. INTRODUCTORY REARxs
THIS paper is an inquiry into the problem of whether a State, A, has
a right under international law to demand from another State, B,
the admission into the latter, of persons whom B recognizes as its na-
tionals and of whose presence within its territory A desires to be relieved.
The large number of deportation orders outstanding in the United
States,' which are unenforceable on account of the refusal of other
States to admit the persons concerned, demonstrates that the question
under discussion is not without considerable practical implications. This
paper arrives at the conclusion that international law imposes no duty
upon States to admit their nationals. In the United States the subject
matter of this paper has received little attention. This is somewhat sur-
prising as the two opposing views have been clearly put forward by
agents of the United States Government and published in juxtaposition.,
In United States ex rel. Hudak v. Uh 3 the court said: "That the sov-
ereign may deport the alien to the country of his nativity and of which
he is presumably a citizen cannot be questioned. Such power is limited
only by the power of the native sovereignty to refuse to receive the
alien if it so chooses." 4 On the other hand the Under Secretary of State,
Mr. Grew, in a letter on October 19, 1926, to the Assistant to the At-
torney General, Mr. Donovan, expressed the opinion that Guatemala
was under a duty to receive a Guatemalan citizen.'
As no general international treaty or judicial precedent exists on the
international law of admission of nationals, it becomes necessary to ex-
amine all evidence which might tend to establish a rule of customary
international law. The search for evidence of customary international
law necessitates an examination of the pertinent international treaties
and of the extent to which States have admitted their nationals upon
the demand of the expelling State. Secondary sources of customary in-
ternational law worthy of investigation are the strength and hierarchial
position of the right of sojourn granted by States to their citizens, and
* Teaching and Research Fellow, Georgetown Iaw. Centre.
1. The Immigration and Naturalization Systems of the United States, Report of the
Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 639 (1950) states that
on April 15, 1949, there were 3,278 unenforceable orders of deportation outstanding in
the United States. Id. at 637 mentions 3,600 as the latest figure.
2. 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 740 (1942).
3. 20 F. Supp. 928 (ND. N.Y. 1937).
4. Id. at 929.
5. 3 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 2, at 740.
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the degree of effectiveness of the procedures available for the implemen-
tation of the right of entry and sojourn where it exists. It is necessary
to limit this phase of the study to a few representative States. Only the
law of the United States and Germany on the substantive and procedural
aspects of a national's right of entry will receive thorough examination.
A survey and criticism of the opinions of public officials and authors
concerning international legal duty to admit nationals concludes the part
of this paper dealing with the ascertainment of the present state of inter-
national law. A short second part of this study considers whether it is
desirable to develop a rule of international law making it obligatory on
States to receive back their nationals.
Before turning to the evidence which might support the rule of law
under discussion, a few remarks on the right to expel foreigners and on
the nature of nationality are appropriate.
B. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
1. Right to Expel Foreigners
A duty to receive back nationals presupposes that a State demand-
ing the reception has the liberty under international law to rid itself of
the presence of the alien.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "The right to exclude
or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, [is] ... an inherent and in-
alienable right of every sovereign.... ." But three Justices dissented from
this decision on the ground that the due process clause of the United
States Constitution prohibited the infliction of such "punishment" on
residents by administrative action.7 If the dissenters' conception of the
legal nature of deportation were correct it might be extended to inter-
national law, so that the expulsion of a resident foreigner for other than
criminal behavior could be classified as a denial of justice giving rise
to a claim for reparation against the expelling State.8 It is also interest-
ing to note that expulsion was occasionally regarded as a somewhat
extraordinary exercise of State power akin to retaliation.0
6. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893).
7. Id. at 741, 759, 763.
8. Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, Francisco do Vitoria and His Law
of Nations (1934) De Indis, § I, proof IV: app. A at XXXVI: ". . . . It would not
be lawful for the French to prevent the Spanish from travelling or even from living in
France, . . ."
9. The Alien Labour Act, 1897, 60 and 61 Vict. c. 11, as amended by 61 Vict. c. 2 (1897)
and 1 Edw. 7 c. 13 s. 9 (1901) (Canada): "This Act shall apply only to the importation or
immigration of such persons as reside in or are citizens of such foreign countries as have
enacted and retained in force, or as enact and retain in force, laws or ordinances applying
to Canada, of a character similar to this Act." Attorney General for Canada v. Cain,
[19061 A.C. 542, 545 (P.C.)
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But the practice of States in this field has never brought into serious
dispute the right of expulsion of foreigners in a humane manner.10 The
numerous treaties of commerce and friendship containing clauses like,
"The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall be per-
mitted to enter, travel, and reside in the territories of the other... to
carry on every form of commercial activity... to do anything incidental
to or necessary for the enjoyment of any of the foregoing priviliges upon
the same terms as nationals of the state of residence... 2'I do not re-
sult in a relinquishment by States of their right to expel nationals of the
other contracting party. Consequently such treaty provisions also do
not deprive the State of the alleged right to demand the admission of
expellees of the State of nationality. Such rights are sometimes sought
to be preserved in the treaty by a proviso: "Nothing contained in this
Treaty shall be construed to affect existing statutes of either of the High
Contracting Parties in relation to the immigration of aliens or the right
of either of the High Contracting Parties to enact such statutes."' - A
treaty lacking such provisos ". . . should not be considered as renouncing
such an important attribute of sovereignty as the right of expul-
sion.. .. This interpretation seems to be generally accepted,14 and
only occasionally is the treaty clause phrased so as to limit the right of
expulsion by enumerating the causes which shall be regarded as sufficient
to justify it. 5
The law of expulsion of foreigners may be briefly summarized. It
is generally maintained that a State is not completely free to expel
foreigners indiscriminately. Expulsion is justified if it is executed for
the preservation of public law and order. The determination of whether
public law and order is endangered through the presence of an alien is
left to the bona fide determination of the territorial State.10 It is not
10. Ralston, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, at 914, Mal case, where the broad
language of the umpire ". .. may . . . , expel persons dangerous to the welfare of the
country, . . 2' is not called for by the facts of the case, but may be explained by the
Venezuelan law which apparently provided for expulsion not of foreigners as such but
of persons with less than two years residence.
11. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the US. and the
Republic of Austria, June 19, 1928, art. I, § 1, T.S. No. 118, at 243.
12. Id. art. I, § 7, at 244.
13. Dep't of State Instruction of April 9, 1912, to the American Consul General at
Hamburg, cited from American Turkish Claims Settlement Under the Agreement of Dem.
24, 1923, and Supplemental Agreements Between the United States and Turkey, opinions
prepared by F. K. Nielsen and J. Ma.htos (1937), hereinafter Nielsen Op. and Rep, 503,
at 509, Lazar Rokach case.
14. Heinrichs, Deutsche Niederlassungsvertrge und Vbernahmeabkomen 179 (1903).
15. For an example, see Convention of Commerce and Navigation Between Latvia and
Sweden, signed at Stockholm, Dec. 22, 1924, art. 2, League of Nations T.S. 36, at 285.
16. Ralston, op. cit. supra note 10, at 265, Paquet case, at 914, Maal case; Fleischmana,
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
necessary here to stake out the exact bounds of the right of expulsion
and the methods which may legally be brought to bear on the expellee.
Within broad limits of discretion a State may command an alien to leave
its territory and enforce the order by appropriate means.
2. How is Nationality Maintained While Residing in a Foreign
Jurisdiction?
It is not easy to see in what way nationality can persist after the
person has left the territory of his state of nationality, as the bulk of the
rights and duties pertaining to that st4tus are at least suspended during
his absence. It has, therefore, been suggested that: "Nationality, as
personal status, has full juridical effect only within local jurisdiction. It
lacks extraterritoriality, and its effects are therefore suspended in every
instance when a moral and physical person moves to a foreign soil....",7
But this difficulty can be overcome if proper emphasis is given to the
factor that nationality, understood as membership in a political society
most nearly normal by the standards of the society concerned, has a
strong subjective flavor. Persons abroad may continue to be regarded
as belonging to the society which they have left, as evidenced by its
nationality laws and other statutes."' The right to re-enter the territory
may be thought of as the bridge over which the reinstatement of the
suspended legal status can be accomplished. If this bridge is destroyed
a kind of de facto statelessness may be said to result. But it is submitted
that such de facto loss of nationality cannot be completely equated with
the de jure deprivation of nationality. Otherwise, the problem dealt
with in this paper would be moot.
3. Duty to Receive Nationals
Turning to the alleged duty to admit citizens to the national territory,
no universal or sufficiently general treaty establishing or recognizing such
duty can be found.
a. Customary laws as derivable from treaties
It becomes, therefore, necessary to look for evidence of a general
practice accepted as law. Such custom may be inferred from multilateral
Fremdenrecht Ausweisung, in I Strupp Wirterbuch des V6lkerrechts und der Diplomatic
334-339 (1924); Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States § 61, at 230 n. 3, citing Mr. Geshman, Secretary of State, to Mr. Smithe,
Minister of Haiti, Nov. 5, 1894, and at 231 (2d ed. 1945); I Oppenbeim, International
Law 631, 632 (7th ed. 1948) ; Verdross, V61kerrecht 579 (2d ed. 1950) ; Irizarry Y Puente,
Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in Latin America, 36 Am. J. Int'l L. 252, 263 (1942).
17. Brown, Cardenas Doctrine, 34 Am. J. Int'l L. 300 (1940).
18. German Criminal Code, § 3, Schnke, Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar at 52 (5th ed.
1951).
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or bilateral treaties accepted by an overwhelming majority of nations.10
Numerous treaties especially between the nations of central Europe
and of the American continent recognize either expressly or by necessary
implication the duty to admit nationals. The treaties between Germany
and Denmark of December 11, 1873,- Germany and Switzerland of
November 13, 1909,21 and Germany and the Netherlands of December
17, 190422 obligate each party to receive back at the request of the other
its nationals, and former nationals who have not acquired another na-
tionality. These and other similar treaties 2 3 were modeled on the
"Gothaer Vertrag" of July 15, 1851, accepted by Luxembourg and all
German States except Austria, Holstein, Lauenburg, and Liechtenstein,
which regulated in detail these questions and also those related to per-
sons stateless ab initio.24 Switzerland had an essentially similar treaty
with Sardinia as early as 1827.2
Even stronger evidence of a customary international duty is supplied
by those treaties which do not in terms spell out the obligation to receive
expelled nationals, but show by implication that the parties proceeded
on the assumption of the existence of such duty. To this category be-
longs the treaty between Germany and Belgium which provides that a
demand for admission must not be refused on the basis that the indigent
expellee has lost his nationality.28 In a treaty between Germany and
19. Schwarzenberger, Frontiers of International Law, 6 The Yearbook of World Af-
fairs 246, 257 (1952).
20. Uebereinkommen zwischen deni Deutschen Reiche und Danemark wegen wcchsel-
seitiger Unterstitzung ifbedirfger und Uebernahme Auszuweisender, art. 4, Dec. 11,
1873, Zentralblatt fiir das Deutsche Reich, hereinafter ZI.d.D.L, 1874, at 31, and Keller-
Trautmann, Kommentar zum Reics-und Staatsangehurigkeitsgesetz vora 22. Juli 1913,
at 529 (1914).
21. Niederlassungvertrag zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Schweizerischen Ed-
genossenschaft, art. 7, Nov. 13, 1909, Reichsesetzblatt, hereinafter RG BL, 1911, at 887,
and Keller-Trautmann, op. cit. supra note 20, at 503.
22. Niederlassungsvertmg zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und den Niederlanden, art. 6
RG BL 1906, at 879, and Keller-Trautmann, op. cit. supra note 20 at 489.
23. Uebernahmeabkommen zwischen dear Deutschen Reich und Italien wegen wechsel-
seitiger Unterstitzung Hilfsbedurftiger, art. 4 and art. 5, Aug. 8, 1873 Z.f.d.D.R. 1873, at
475, and Keler-Trautmann, op. cit. supra note 20, at 533; Bekanntmachung, betreffend das
zwischen Deutschland und Oesterech-Ungam beziglich der Obernahme Auszuweisender
(unterm 26. Juli 1875) getroffene Abkommen Z.f.d.D.R. 1873 p. 475, and Keller-Traut-
mann, op. cit. supra note 20, p. 533.
24. Vertrag zwischea verschiedenen deutschen Staaten wegen gegenseitige= Verpflichtung
zur Uebernahme der Auszuweisenden, art. 1, Keller-Trautmann, op. it. supra note 20, at
481.
25. De CIaparte, Die V6lkerrechtliche Repatrlationspfficht in ihrer Entwicklung
dargestellt nach den sie betreffenden Vertrggen der Schweiz und des Deutschen Relches at
31 (1911).
26. Deklaration zwiscben Deutschland und Belgien in Beziehung auf Unterstitzung und
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Russia the class of persons who must be admitted is not restricted
to indigent persons but again the duty to receive is expressly recog-
nized only with respect to former nationals.27 The agreement of
July 29, 1933, between the United Kingdom and France also fails to
mention a duty to receive back, but specifies only the ports to which
expelled persons shall be deported and the allocation of expenses.2 8
One modem multilateral treaty may be regarded as imposing a general
duty on States to receive nationals. The Convention on the Status of
Aliens, concluded at the Sixth International Conference of American
States, at Havana, February 20, 192829 provides in article 6: "States are
required to receive their nationals expelled from foreign soil who seek
to enter their territority."' 0 It must be noted that by a literal applica-
tion of the article quoted a State may refuse to comply with another
State's demand to receive back its national if the expellee himself does
not "seek admission" but prefers to stay where he is or to enter a third
State. Moreover, the treaty is still unratified by seven member States
of the Organization of American States,31 while fourteen have ratified it.
This appears insufficient to create customary law, either general or local.
The treaties between Germany and France of 188082 and between
Great Britain and Germany of 1913 3 leave the receiving State entirely
free-with one narrow exception in the latter treaty-to refuse admis-
sion. The weight to be attributed to these treaties depends somewhat
on whether they are to be regarded as granting to the State of nationality
the privilege to refuse admission. The language employed tends to in-
dicate that the parties did not view the agreements as impairing a general
rule of obligatory admission.
It may be doubtful on which side of the issue the second modern multi-
lateral treaty on the subject should be placed. The Special Protocol
Heimschaffung der Hilfsbediirftigen, art. 1 and art. 4, July 7, 1877, Z.f.d.D.R. at 411, and
Keller-Trautman, op. cit. supra note 20, at 528.
27. 3 Deutsch-Russisches Uebernahmeabkommen, art. 1 and art. 3, Feb. 10/Jan. 29,
1894, Z.f.d.D.R. at 81, and Keller-Trautmann, op. cit. supra note 20, at 540.
28. Agreement Between His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom,
the Government of India, and the Government of the French Republic Regarding De-
portation from Certain British and French Territories, signed at Paris, July 29, 1933,
League of Nations T.S. 142, at 166.
29. 46 Stat. 2753, T.S. No. 815, IV at 4723.
30. Id. at 2755, T.S. No. 815, IV at 4723.
31. Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela, ac-
cording to a letter of April 23, 1954, by Mr. Manuel Canyes, Chief, Division of Law and
Treaties of the Pan American Union.
32. Abkommen zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich, betreffend das Verfahren bel der
Uebernahme von hilfslosen Personen, verlassenen Kindern und Geisteskranken (1880)
Keller-Trautmann, op. cit. supra note 20, at 532.
33. Ibid.
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Concerning Statelessness, concluded at the Hague April 12, 1930, pro-
vides in article 1:
"If a person, after entering a foreign country, loses his nationality without acquir-
ing another nationality, the State whose nationality he last possessed is bound to
admit him, at the request of the State in whose territory he is:
(i) if he is permanently indigent either as a result of an incurable disease or
for any other reason; or
(ii) if he has been sentenced, in the State where he is, to not less than one
month's imprisonment and has either served his sentence or obtained total or partial
remission thereof.
"In the first case the State whose nationality such person last possessed may re-
fuse to receive him, if it undertakes to meet the cost of relief in the country where
he is as from the thirtieth day from the date on which the request was made. In
the second case the cost of sending him back shall be borne by the country making
the request."'3 4
Until 1939 this Special Protocol had been ratified by Belgium, Brazil,
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, the Union of South
Africa, India, China, and Salvador. 5 The relatively small number of
ratifiers of this treaty tends to warrant the inference that the majority
of nations do not regard the obligations contained in article 1 (1) as
compatible with their rights and interests. A comparison with the word-
ing of the Basis of Discussion No. 2, "If a person, after entering a
foreign country, loses his nationality without acquiring another nation-
ality, the State whose national he was remains bound to admit him to its
territory at the request of the State where he is residing"310 indicates
that article 1 of the Special Protocol must be given a narrow construc-
tion. The omission of the words "remains bound" makes impossible the
conclusion that if a former national must be admitted under certain
circumstances admission must a fortiori generally be granted to na-
tionals. Moreover, article 2 par. 3 of the Special Protocol: "It is under-
stood that, in so far as any point is not covered by any of the provisions
of the preceding article, the existing principles and rules of international
law shall remain in force"37 is an express caveat against an argument
that article 1 is based on the assumption of such a general duty to admit
nationals.
34. League of Nations, 11 Official Journal 881 (1930) Official No.: C. 1227. M. 114,
1930 V., V Hudson, International Legislation, No. 252 at 388 (1929-31), 24 Am. J. Int'l
L. 211 (Supp. 1930). This protocol did not enter into force, though it was ratified by
eight States, as the required number of ten ratifications or accessions was not reached.
Report on Nationality including Statelessness by Manly 0. Hudson to the International
Law Commission 4th session, U.N. General Assembly Documents A/CN. 4/50, at 9 (1952).
35. League of Nations Publication V, Legal, 3, at 75 (1939).
36. League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International Law. The
Hague 1930, First Committee on Nationality, Nationality Proposals 1-78, at 2, 24 Am. J.
Int'l L. 10 (Supp. 1930). (Emphasis added.)
37. See note 34 supra.
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It must therefore be concluded that the Special Protocol Concerning
Statelessness tends to negative rather than support the inference of a
customary duty to admit."8
This review shows that the duty to receive back nationals has won
only limited recognition by treaties, which in itself is insufficient to re-
sult in a rule of general customary international law.
b. International State practice
Therefore, the practice of States, apart from treaties, should be taken
into account.
It appears that States endeavoring to deport aliens frequently en-
counter opposition on the part of the State to which the expellee is
sought to be deported. On April 15, 1949, there were 3,278 unenforce-
able orders of deportation outstanding in the United States.8" Un-
certainty, however, persists as to the number of deportees whose nation-
ality had been definitely determined. It may well be that the standard
is national origin rather than nationality or citizenship as conferred or
withdrawn by the municipal law of the State concerned. This doubt is
caused by the statutory language which must have been the standard
for determining the country of deportation named in the deportation
order. The statute prescribed deportation of aliens "to the country
whence they came."40 It had been understood to refer to the State which,
at the time of deportation, includes the place from which the alien came.41
But this interpretation of the statute was not universal. When in-
terpreting the statutory language in Delany v. Moraitis,42 the court em-
phasized the nationality bond: "The purpose of the deportation Statute
... is to remove from this country an alien who is here contrary to our
laws, and place him under the jurisdiction of the political power to which
he owes allegiance. '43 The case involved a Greek seaman who had come
to the United States from Spain on a Greek vessel. Deportation could
neither be effected to Greece which was occupied by Germany nor to
Spain which refused admission. The District Court was reversed in hold-
ing that deportation to England, where the Greek government in exile
was functioning, was illegal. But it does not appear from opinion that
the appellant's citizenship was decisive for the reversal. Its policy was
38. Art. 2 par. 2 of the Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness, supra note 34, dis-
claims that customary international law is in any way affected by art. 1.
39. See note 1 supra.
40. U.S. Immigration Act § 20, 39 Stat. 890, 8 U.S.C.A. 156 (1917), (repealed 66 Stat.
279 (1952)).
41. Moraitis v. Delany, 46 F. Supp. 425 (D.D. Md. 1942).
42. 136 F. 2d 129 (4th Cir. 1943), reversing 46 F. Supp. 425 (D.D. Md. 1942).
43. Id. at 131.
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rather to bring about deportation. It was not denied that "1... the term
'country' as used in the statute must be construed, ordinarily, to refer
to the territory from which the alien came." 4 It must, therefore, be as-
sumed that this latter test and not the nationality test underlies the
figures quoted. Whether the statute referred to the country from which
an alien had last entered or the country in which he had his last domicile
is immaterial for the present study. It is sufficient to point out that the
statute did not expressly specify and was not construed to refer to the
country of nationality. The language in Frick v. Lewis:' "... the words
'returned to the country whence he came' 46 were intended to refer to the
place of nativity or citizenship"47 is dictum and has no support in prior
holdings.
In addition, the breakdown of the undeportables conspicuously lacks
the class of stateless persons. In view of the possible meta-legal use of
the word "nationality," the report cannot be regarded as complete proof
against the practice of admitting nationals to the national territory.
Nevertheless, it appears likely that some undeportables have national-
ity and that the proper government upon being contacted refused ad-
mission; so that, although the practice of keeping nationals out of their
home country is certainly not as extensive as a superficial reading of the
report suggests, it is safe to infer that their entry is not universally
permitted. Russia,4" Great Britain49 and other Stateslo are reported to
have refused admission to their nationals.
c. Municipal State practice
Some light is shed on the question by an examination of State con-
stitutions. Most of the more recent ones contain some provision on the
right to sojourn in the country. This right is sometimes bestowed on
the "people," 51 or all the inhabitants of the republic, 2 or on every "per-
44. Id. at 130.
45. 195 Fed. 693 (6th Cir. 1912).
46. The reference is to 34 Stat. 904, 905 (1907) § 20, 21 of the Immigration Act.
47. 195 Fed. at 701 (6th Cir. 1912).
4S. Castrin, Die gegenseitigen Pflichten der Staaten in bezug auf den Aufenthalt und
die Aufnahme ihrer Staatsangeh~rigen und der Staatenlosen, 11 Zeitschrift ffir auXsmLid-
isches Mffentliches Recht und V61kerrecht 325, at 366 (1942).
49. Heinrichs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 180.
50. As regards other states see Castrin, op. cit. supra note 48, at 374; Lessing, Das
Recht der Staatsangeh~igkeit und die Aberkennung der StaaLtangehdrigkeit zu Straf-und
Sicherungszwecken, XII Bibliotheca Visseriana 144 (1937).
51. Const. of China of Dec. 25, 1941, art. 10, I Peaslee, Constitution of Nations 446
(1950).
52. Const. of Chile, Sept. 18, 1925, art. 10 § 15, I Peaslee, op. cit. supra note S1, at
415; Const. of Argentina, March 16, 1949, art. 26, I Peaslee, op. cit. supra note S1, at 66.
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son"3 in countries where citizenship is not adopted by constitutional law
as the nexus to which the right to reside in the territory attaches. Euro-
pean constitutions usually predicate the enjoyment of this right on
citizenship.54 But irrespective of who the beneficiary of the right may
be, the right is seldom absolute and unconditional but subject to the
law or police regulations. 55
How secure a national's right of entry is may well depend on whether
or not the courts are unconditionally open to him to establish his na-
tionality.56
(1) Practice of the United States
The United States Supreme Court has had no occasion to pass on the
exact question of whether the Constitution confers the right of entering
the country to citizens, or whether this right is given only by way of
negative inference drawn from the absence of statutes restricting the
admission of citizens. The closest judicial expression has come to as-
serting the constitutional character of a citizen's right to enter the
country, is a decision by Mr. Justice Field: ". . . no citizen can be ex-
cluded from this country except in punishment for crime. Exclusion
for any other cause is unknown to our laws, and beyond the power of
congress.1 57 The Supreme Court in later decisions carefully avoided a
premature pronouncement on the subject: "The statutes purport to ex-
clude aliens only. They create or recognize, for present purposes it does
not matter which, the right of citizens outside the jurisdiction to re-
turn. .... ),58
The first sentence of the last quotation was and still is correct as a
general proposition. The present law contains no express provision
under which nationals of the United States can be excluded. The pro-
visions relating to detention and examination, "0 exclusion and deporta-
tions60 are in terms applicable only to aliens, thus withholding from
public officials the power to exclude citizens.
53. Const. of Bolivia, Nov. 23, 1945, art. 6, I Peaslee, op. cit. supra note 51, at 153;
Const. of Brazil, Sept. 24, 1946, art. 142, I Peaslee, op. cit. supra note 51, at 209.
54. Swiss Const., Sept. 12, 1948, art. 44, I1 Peaslee, op. cit. supra note 51, at 134;
Const. of Italy, Jan. 1, 1948, art. 16, II Peaslee, op. cit. supra note 51, at 281; Const. of
Albania, March 15, 1946, art. 19, par. 6, I Peaslee, op. cit. supra note 51, at 41; see also
Const. of Burma, Sept. 24, 1947, § 17(iv), I Peaslee, op. cit. supra note 51, at 252.
55. See footnote 54 supra.
56. Contra: Zimmerman, Judicial Versus Administrative Determination of Controverted
Claims to United States Citizenship, 43 Geo. L.J. 19, 51 (1954).
57. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. 905, 910 (D. Cir. Cal. 1884).
58. Justice Holmes in Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, at 12 (1908).
59. U.S. Immigration Act §§ 232, 233, 238, 66 Stat. 196, 197, 202, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1222,
1223, 1228 (1952).
[Vol. 24
DUTY TO RECEIVE NATIONALS
Where a statute could be construed so as to exclude citizens, the
Supreme Court has adopted an interpretation under which citizens are
admitted, declaring the contrary construction as achieving "... an
anomalous result which, obviously, Congress did not intend."0'
The procedures available to implement the citizen's right of entry
have varied, and deserve consideration, as they tend to show the degree
of effectiveness of this right.
The traditional remedy against wrongful exclusion and deportation
from the United States based on a finding of lack of United States citi-
zenship, has been a petition for habeas corpus. In United States v. Ju
Toy' the District Court on a writ of habeas corpus decided contrary to
the Secretary of Commerce and seemingly on new evidence that J.T oy
was a native-born citizen. The Supreme Court held that the petition
should not have been entertained as no abuse of discretion had been
alleged in it. The Supreme Court further held that as to the claim of
citizenship, the administrative determination was conclusive. This claim
of citizenship deserved a judicial examination de novo as little as did
claims of prior domicile or belonging to a class excepted from the ex-
clusion acts.e The Court doubted whether the Fifth Amendment was
applicable:
"The petitioner, although physically within our boundaries, is to be regarded as if
he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction and kept there while his right
to enter was under debate. If, for purposes of argument, we assume that the Fifth
Amendment applies to him and that to deny entrance to a citizen is to deprive him
of liberty, we nevertheless are of the opinion that with regard to him due process
of law does not require a judicial trial .. .the decision may be entrusted to an
executive officer. .. '6
In Chin Yow v. United States5 the Supreme Court ordered the writ
of habeas corpus to issue. The District Court was held to be empowered
to try de novo the question of citizenship if it could be shown in con-
formity with the petitioner's allegations that he had been allowed nothing
but the semblance of a hearing. But the principle of finality of the ad-
ministrative determination of the issue of citizenship as established in
the it. Toy case was left undisturbed: "... . the denial of a hearing can-
not be established by proving that the decision [made by the immigra-
60. Id. §§ 236, 237, 241, 66 Stat. 200, 201, 204, 8 US.C.A. §§ 1226, 1227, 1251 (1952).
61. United States v. New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Co, 269 US. 304, at 310
(1925).
62. 193 U.S. 253 (1905). See also, Chin Yow v. United States, 203 US. 8 (1903);
Tang Tun v. Edsel 223 US. 673 (1912); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 US. 272 (1912).
63. 198 US. at 262.
64. Id. at 263.
65. 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
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tion official concerning citizenship] was wrong."68 The question of ap-
plicability of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment left open
in the Ju Toy decision was answered in the affirmative: 7 But this did
not endow the citizens' right of entry with constitutional character.
The hearing, properly so called, which was sufficient to determine con-
clusively the deportee's status suffered by its nature from several severe
shortcomings, in that: the prospective deportee could not subpoena wit-
nesses, no punishment was provided for witnesses giving false testimony,
counsel could be excluded during part of the hearing." Consequently
situations like that in United States v. Ju Toy could arise, in which the
Court after probing the reasonableness of the immigration official's ad-
mission and consideration of evidence without discovering arbitrary
acts, had to affirm the administrative finding, although "... the Court
might feel that it would have reached a different conclusion than that
reached by the administrative agency.)6 9
Illustrative of the degree of unreasonableness which the administrative
agency sought to have approved by the United States Supreme Court is
the Court's opinion in Kwock Jan Fat v. White:10
".. . this [identification by three witnesses] must be regarded as such an important
part of the testimony of these most important witnesses that it may well have
been ...sufficient to determine the result in a case even much stronger against a
claim of United States citizenship than was made in this record against the claim of
petitioner, and a report [to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor as the reviewing
authority] which suppressed or omitted it was not a fair report and a hearing based
upon it was not a fair hearing.... It is better that many Chinese immigrants should
be improperly admitted than that one natural born citizen of the United States
should be permanently excluded from his country." 71
The sentiment expressed by the Court apparently motivated it to dis-
regard the limitations imposed by the previous decisions: In Ng Fung Ho
v. White7 2 the fairness of the administrative hearing was not scrutinized;
instead the mandate to the lower court was to determine the question of
citizenship aparently without regard to the administrative decision.
"The constitutional question . . . is: May a [lawfully admitted] resident of the
United States who claims to be a citizen be arrested and deported on executive
66. Id. at 13.
67. Id. at 12-13.
68. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468-470 (1912).
69. Mah Ying Og. v. Clark, 81 F. Supp. 696, 697 (D.D.C. 1948). See also Wong Chow
Gin v. Cahill, 79 F. 2d 854 (9th Cir. 1935).
70. 253 U.S. 454 (1920). A discussion and criticism of the administrative procedure
is contained in the dissent by Mr. Justice Brewer in United States v. Sing Tuck, 194
U.S. 161, 170 (1904).
71. 253 U.S. at 464.
72. 259 US. 276 (1922).
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order? ...They supported the claim by evidence sufficient, if believed, to entitle
them to a finding of citizenship. Jurisdiction in the executive to order deporta-
tion exists only if the person arrested is an alien. The claim of citizenship is thus
a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact .... Against the danger of such depriva-
tion without the sanction afforded by judicial proceedings, the Fifth Amendment
affords protection in its guarantee of due process of law.. .. remanded to the Dis-
trict Court for trial... of the question of citizenship.... .,73
The method, to wit, testing the jurisdiction of the administrative,
seized upon to eviscerate the finality of administrative action had been
urged on constitutional grounds74 previously, without having been
adopted. If the Ng Fung Ho decision is given the wide scope attributed
to it in a later opinion by its author, Mr. Justice Brandeis, saying, "A
citizen who claims that his liberty has been infringed is entitled, upon
habeas corpus, to the opportunity of a judicial determination of the
facts.. .. opportunity must be accorded to any resident of the United
States who claims to be a citizen .... ,,75 it would by implication overrule
the prior holdings.71
It is not possible to square the decisions by making the Ng Fung Ho
case turn on the substantiality of the showing of citizenship: "Only in
the event an alleged alien asserts his United States citizenship in a hear-
ing before the Department, and supports his claim by substantial evi-
dence, is he entitled to a trial de novo of that issue in the disrict court.""7
For, in the Ju Toy case, the evidence of citizenship found sufficient by
the District Court to establish petitioners' claim must have been sub-
stantial, and in the Chin Yow case, Mr. Justice Holmes, to make quite
sure that the trial court would not enter on a consideration of the merits
of the claim of United States citizenship, which was the only substantive
issue, said, ". . .denial of a hearing cannot be established by proving
that the decision was wrong. ' 78
The true distinction can only rest on the fact that the Ng Ftug Ho
decision was not an exclusion case but dealt with petitioners who had
been lawfully admitted as citizens to residence in the United States.
This circumstance was stressed in the opinion :"But they were not in the
position of persons stopped at the border when seeking to enter this
country. Nor are they in the position of persons who entered surrepti-
73. Id. at 282-285.
74. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 170 (1904), dissent by Mr. justice
Brewer, and his dissent in United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 264 (1905).
75. SL Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 US. 38, 73, 77 (1936), con-
cutring opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis.
76. Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 US. 193 (1902).
77. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34-35 (1939).
78. 208 U.S. at 13.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tiously."7 9 That this is the actual holding in spite of the broader mean-
ing imputed to its ambit in the two Supreme Court opinions cited was
recognized in Avina v. BrownelO0
The Ng Fung Ho decision, therefore, has only indirect bearing on the
question of the procedure by which a person claiming citizenship can ob-
tain entrance to the country.
Notwithstanding the suggestion advanced in a subsequent decision that
. . on habeas corpus ... the function of the courts has always been
limited to the enforcement of due process requirements,"'" it must be
emphasized that the departure from the previous doctrine was accom-
plished by a change in statutory construction rather than on constitu-
tional grounds. It is true that the Ng Fung Ho doctrine is still referred
to as operative.2 But the underlying reasoning is unconvincing, as the
statute provided that "In every case where any person is ordered de-
ported from the United States under the provisions of this subchapter,
or of any law or treaty, the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be
final.183 This might be regarded as an indication that the Ng Fung Ho
doctrine has constitutional character, as is intimated in the decision it-
self, because it offers the only way of overcoming the conceptual dif-
ficulty of singling out from the various statutory prerequisites for the
legality of deportation, the one requirement of alienage for judicial re-
view. But this has never been clearly enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court.
It must therefore be assumed that it still is ... impossible for us to
hold that it is not competent for Congress to empower a United States
commissioner to determine the various facts on which citizenship de-
pends .... "8
In the Heikkila case the Supreme Court said by way of dictum: "It is
clear that prior to the Administrative Procedure Act habeas corpus was
the only remedy by which deportation orders could be challenged in the
courts. The courts have consistently rejected attempts to use injunc-
tions, declaratory judgments and other type of relief for this purpose.188
But of the cases cited in support none dealt with the declaratory judg-
ment action. In fact, the Declaratory Judgment Act80 was applied in a
79. 259 U.S. at 282.
80. 112 F. Supp. 15, 18 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
81. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 US. 229, 236 (1953).
82. Ibid.
83. U.S. Immigration Act § 19, 39 Stat. 889, 8 US.C.A. § 155 (1917) (repealed 66
Stat. 279 (1952)).
84. Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193, 200 (1902), Zimmerman, op. cit.
supra note 56, at 47.
85. 345 U.S. at 230.
86. Act of June 14, 1934, c. 512, as amended, 28 U.S.CA. § 2201 (1949).
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situation where the deportation order had not even been issued. In
Perkins v. ERg8 7 the petitioner sued to "... obtain (1) a declaratory
judgment that she is a citizen of the United States... (2) an injunction
against the ...Commissioner of Immigration restraining them [him]
from prosecuting proceedings for her deportation, and (3) an injunction
against the Secretary of State from refusing to issue to her a passport
upon the ground that she is not a citizen.""8 All relief prayed for was
granted. The Supreme Court held that the court below properly recog-
nized the existence of an actual controversy under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act. 9 This decision disproves the language of the Heikkila case,
for it is difficult to see why declaratory judgment action should be avail-
able prior to the issuance of the deportation order, while action taken
under the deportation order itself would be subject only to habeas
corpus review.
Elg's position was identical with that of the petitioners in .Ng Fung Ho
with respect to prior lawful admission as a citizen and presence in the
country. But nothing in the later decision suggests that the remedy of
declaratory judgment suit was intended to be restricted to persons with-
in this category. However, no case came up in which the exact scope
of the new remedy and its availability to persons claiming citizenship
and demanding admittance or resisting deportation was fully tested.
Shortly after the Eig decision the question was clarified by statute: "If
any person who claims a right or privilege as a national of the United
States is denied such right or privilege by any Department or agency,
or executive official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national
of the United States, such person, regardless of whether he is within
the United States or abroad, may institute an action.., for a judgment
declaring him to be a national of the United States." 0
This was a clear pronouncement that declaratory relief was available
to United States citizens under all circumstances without regard to the
absence of the peculiar prerequisites of habeas corpus proceedings, to
wit, final deportation warrant against the petitioner and his being in
custody. Nor was it necessary to await the outcome of the administra-
tive proceedings. The action would lie as soon as the denial occurred.
Whether as a conceptual matter, a new remedy in addition to 28 U.S.CA.
section 2201 was created, the courts did not deem necessary to examine.
The new provision liberalizing access to court for the determination
87. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
8S. Id. at 328.
89. Id- at 349.
90. Act of Oct. 14, 1940, c. 876, Title I, § 503, 54 Stat. I, 1171.
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of the issue of nationality and thus strengthening the citizens' right to
enter the country91 was discontinued in the Act of 1952.
The latest statute takes away the declaratory judgment remedy from
a person within the United States whose citizenship is denied in connec-
tion with an exclusion proceeding, 92 and from a person outside the
United States. It can hardly be argued that this enactment affects only
the former section 903 U.S.C.A. Title 28, leaving section 2201 U.S.C.A.
Title 28 to fall back upon.
It is provided by the new statute that persons other than those apply-
ing for entry as aliens have to be in possession of a certificate of iden-
tity.93 This certificate cannot be issued to alleged nationals of the United
States born abroad and over sixteen years of age unless they have been
previously physically present in the United States. 4 Persons outside
this category intending to enter the United States as nationals have to
obtain a United States passport for entry. Since according to 22 U.S.C.A.
section 212, "No passport shall be granted . . . for any other persons
than those owing allegiance ... to the United States," no legal claim to
a passport is vested in a United States citizenY5 So the issuance of a pass-
port may be refused according to the discretion of the Secretary of State
based on public interest. The refusal to issue a passport is not subject
to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act because the
action is by law committed to discretion 0 For the same reason, it has
been held, an injunction to the Secretary of State will not lie, 7 and a
mandamus action cannot be brought in the absence of a showing that
the exercise of discretion was arbitrary or capricious. 8 The latter ex-
ception apparently was regarded as applicable where the Secretary of
State had failed for eight months to act on an application to issue a
certificate of identity.9 The broad discretion of the Secretary of State
with regard to the issuance of a passport is attenuated somewhat by the
Federal Regulations which require that the tentative denial of a passport
application has to be communicated to the applicant writing together
with the reasons therefor. The alleged national has to be given an op-
portunity to be heard and may appeal.
100
Decisions upholding the discretional character of the issuance of pass-
91. Gan Seow Tung v. Clark, 83 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
92. U.S. Immigration Act § 360, 66 Stat. 273, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (1952).
93. U.S. Immigration Act § 360(c), 66 Stat. 273, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1503(c) (1952).
94. U.S. Immigration Act § 360(c), 66 Stat. 273, 8 U..CA. § 1503(b) (1952).
95. 22 C.F.R. § 51.75.
96. Act of June 11, 1946, c. 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009 (1950).
97. Yee Gwing Mee v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
98. Eng. v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 682 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
99. Look Yun Lin v. Acheson, 95 F. Supp. 583 (NJD. Cal. 1951).
100. 22 C.F.R. § 51.143 makes applicable §§ 51.135-51.142 (1954).
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ports and certificates of identity1°' do not conflict with the holding in
Acheson v. Nobuo Ishimaru,10 2 where an appeal from an order to issue
a certificate of identity to enable the plaintiff to testify in an action for
judgment declaring his status as a national of the United States was
held inappropriate on the grounds that the order was interlocutory, 1 21
being analagous to a subpoena duces tecum10 3 and that the denial was
contrary to 8 U.S.C.A. section 801(c)(e).
The net result of the Nationality Act of 1952, therefore, appears to
be the resurrection of the law with respect to nationals' remedies against
non-admittance as it stood prior to EIg v. Perkins. The extension of the
Ng Fung Ho doctrine to a petitioner whose right of entry is denied by
the administrative agency on the grounds that he is not a national is
carefully guarded against. 04 The responsibility of passing on the ques-
tion of nationality for purposes of admission is within very wide bound-
aries entrusted to administrative agencies. The burden of providing his
status as a national is on the claimant.'0 5
This poses the problem of whether, after having found a person to
be a United States national, the discretion of the administrative agency
could conceivably be exercised to exclude him from entering the United
States. This is impossible for the immigration authorities, as their duty
of admitting a citizen recognized as such is clearly established by the
absence of a provision permitting his exclusion. But a citizen's right of
entry might be frustrated if the Department of State were free to deny
isuance of a passport to a person whose status as a United States na-
tional is undisputed. The answer here turns on the interpretation of
"discretion" as used in 22 C.F.R. section 51.75. It is submitted that the
administrative discretion properly exercised in the public interest cannot
lead to the denial of a passport to a national abroad who needs the
document for his return to the United States. Such act would show an
arbitrary disregard of the state's interest, in allowing for the entry of
its nationals, as evidenced by his not being excluded under law. It can-
not be asumed that it was the intention of the legislature to grant such
effective power to the Secretary of State in the form of a mere endowment
with administrative discretion, to keep a United States national outside
the country. More explicit language would be required to achieve that
result.
101. See notes 98, 99 supra.
102. 185 F. 2d 547, 548-549 (9th Cir. 1950). Cf. Avina v. Brownef, 112 F. Supp.
15, 19 n. 4 (S.D. Tem. 1953).
102a. Cf. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (Supp. 1954).
103. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
104. U.S. Immigration Act § 360(a) (c), 66 Stat. 273, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1503(a) (c) (1952).
105. US. Immigration Act § 291, 66 Stat. 234, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1361 (1952).
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The laws relating to the issuance of passports to communists offers
an analogy supporting the proposition put forward here. By act of
Congress 0 6 it is made illegal for persons belonging to communist or-
ganizations to apply for passports or to use or to attempt to use pass-
ports. In seeming contradiction therewith is 22 C.F.R. section 51.135
providing "... . no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate
return to the United States, shall be issued to... members of the Com-
munist party.. ." This regulation can be upheld as conforming to the
mandate of Congress only on an argument that a passport for direct and
immediate return to the United States is not a passport in the sense
in which that term is used in the statute referred to. Such bold interpre-
tation must be adopted to give effect to the strong policy of providing
for the admission of United States nationals expressed in the immigra-
tion laws. If in this way the apparent encroachment on congressional
legislation can be justified, no consideration of public interest could be
strong enough to permit the withholding from a citizen of a "passport"
for immediate and direct entry into the United States.
To sum up, if the interpretation of United States laws here advanced
be correct, they do not exclude United States nationals from entering
the territory, either expressly or by implication.
The burden of establishing the facts giving rise to his status as a na-
tional is placed on the claimant. The power to determine the question
of nationality is largely entrusted to administrative agencies whose action
is subject to judicial review only to a limited extent. The procedure to
be followed by a national desiring entry may, at times, be onerous to the
degree of defeating the right to admission.
(2) German practice
In Germany the constitution of 1871 contained in article 3107 a provi-
sion corresponding roughly to the privileges and immunities clause of the
United States Constitution. 08 It enjoined the states from discriminatinp
against citizens of other German states but did not confer a constitu.
tional right of entry upon German nationals.
The German Statute of November 1, 1867 (Freiziigigkeitsgesetz)1 1
permitted German nationals to sojourn anywhere in the Reich's territor
where they were able to secure shelter, apparently qualifying the righi
of entry. The same law, in section 3, provided for restrictions on free.
doa of locomotion based on state law and police action. The Frei.
106. 68 Stat. 778, 50 U.S.CA. § 785 (Supp. 1954).
107. BG B1. 1871, at 65.
108. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
109. Bundesgesetzblatt 1867, at 55. § 1 was made effective for the Reich by the Lay
of April 22, 1871, BG B1. 1871, at 87.
[Vol. 24
DUTY TO RECEIVE NATIONALS
zifgigkeitsgesetz made no reference to exclusion of German nationals from
the Reich. Its context indicates that its primary, if not only, purpose
was to regulate the movement of persons already lawfully present in
Germany. Apart from such reasoning it cannot be denied that the ap-
plication of these provisions of the Freizigigkeitsgesetz clearly could
lead to the exclusion of German nationals.
As to exclusion of nationals whose admission was demanded by other
States the principle of allowing their entry has been asserted."0 But this
principle was not general. It applied to foreign States only on the basis
of reciprocity 11'
Under the Weimar Constitution, article 111 guaranteed freedom of
locomotion to all citizens. This guarantee, however, applied only against
administrative interference which could otherwise have been based on
the general police power. It was expressly made subject to legislative
restrictions." 2 Thus the previous law remained in force.113
New legislation, the Law for the Protection of the Republic, was in-
deed promulgated to permit the exclusion of persons belonging to families
a member of which had ruled a German state until 1918.l" This law
remained the only one providing clearly for the exclusion of Germans.
Otherwise the laws relating to exclusion or expulsion were directed
against foreigners only." 5 Article 11 of the Bonn Constitution of May
23, 1949116 renews the liberty of locomotion and somewhat limits legisla-
tive encroachments. Article 117 of the Bonn Constitution continues in
force the restriction on the freedom of locomotion which are based on
the present housing shortage. The law providing for the exclusion of
members of former ruling families is thus inferentially repealed.
As section 1 of the Freizigigkeitsgesetz was not enacted with a view
to the post-1945 housing shortage, it can not directly limit the operation
of article 11 of the Bonn Constitution. If this be so, it is difficult to see
110. Keler-Trautmann, op. cit. supra note 20, at 35.
ill. Henrichs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 11, 180.
112. Anschlitz, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August, 1919, at 47S
(13th ed. 1930).
113. Id. art. 178, at 657.
114. Law for the Protection of the Republic (Gesetz zum Schutz der Republik) § 23,
July 21, 1922, RG BL 1922, at 585.
115. § 8, par. 1 Aliens' Police Decree (Auslnderpolizeiverordnung) Aug. 22, 1938,
RG BL I, 1938, at 1053 (translation by the present author): "A foreigner may be re-
jected at the frontier of the German Empire if an order prohibiting his sojourn in the
Empire has been issued." § 5 of the Aliens' Police Decree as amended by § 10, no. 3,
Decree Concerning the Treatment of Aliens, Sept. 5, 1939, RG BL. 1, at 1667: "An alien
!may be prohibited from sojourning in the territory of the Empire if the public interest
I demands it."
116. Von Mangoldt, Das Bonner Grundgesetz 87 (1953).
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how article 11 of the Bonn Constitution could be tacitly conditioned on
the person's ability to find shelter. 17 It is more in line with the liberal
spirit of articles 11 and 117 of the Bonn Constitution to regard section
3 of the Freiziigigkeitsgesetz as superseded. Consequently the exclusion
of a German national can, if at all, only be accomplished under new legis-
lation conforming to the requirements of article 11, paragraph 2 of the
Bonn Constitution." 8
By legislation the Allied High Commission for Germany closed the
German frontiers to anybody except as authorized by the Military Gov-
ernment. 9 No discrimination was made in the law between Germans
and aliens.
Summarizing the German Law, it appears that German nationals could
be excluded either on grounds of express provisions to that effect (Lau
for the Protection of the Republic), or by the discretion granted by
military government legislation, or by an adverse but tenable interpreta-
tion of the Freiziigigkeitsgesetz.
(3) Conclusion concerning municipal state practice
The examination of United States and German municipal law dealint
with entry of nationals reaffirms that cases in which nationals were
denied admittance either on account of procedural obstacles or by sub.
stantive law to that effect must be numerically insignificant in the State,
considered here. Still, the departure from what appears to be fairl3
general practice in itself tends to show that States feel themselves en,
titled to deny entrance to their nationals. Therefore, the prevailing bul
not uniform municipal practice of granting nationals the right to be ad,
mitted cannot support the existence of an international duty toward othel
States to receive back nationals.
d. Opinio juris et necessitatis
The opinion of States on their legal duties in this sphere as expresse(
by municipal judges, executive officials, and the laws of the States do no
117. Id. at 90 assumes this condition.
118. Kommentar zuma Bonner Grundgesetz bearbeitet von Dennewitz et al (1950) art
11, comment II, 1, d; "It follows from the unconditional right to reside . . . that the ex
clusion of a person possessing this right at the time of his re-entry is prohibited." Th
prefix in "re-entry (Wiedereinreise)" should probably be ignored as an unintentional slip.
119. Wil. Gov. Law No. 161 as amended with effect of Dec. 1, 1945, Military Govern
ment Gazette, Germany, U.S. Zone, Issue A, June 1, 1946, p. 53, "Except as authorized b:
Military Government,... no civilian shall cross the boundaries of the U.S. Zone." Milltar,
Government Law No. 17, Military Government Gazette, Germany, U.S. Zone of Contro
Issue M, April 16, 1949, p. 17 continued Law No. 167 and also did not distinguish betwee
Germans and aliens.
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amount to an opinio juris et necessitatis, so that another element in-
dispensable for the creation of customary law is absent.
No cases have arisen in which a State has pressed its claim for admis-
sion of a deportee to his State of nationality to the point of causing
serious diplomatic disputes, or in which a State has taken the claim to an
international tribunal for adjudication.
(1) Opinions of State officials
Where the question has been touched upon by municipal courts their
dicta have gone both ways. In Feldman v. Justica Ptiblica 0 the Su-
preme Court of Brazil dismissed the habeas corpus petition of a Rouman-
ian national whose deportation to his country of origin could not be ef-
fected by reason of Roumania's refusal to permit his entry. The court
disputed the legality of Roumania's conduct, saying: "The country of
origin of the person expelled is not entitled ... to prevent the exercise
of that incontrovertible right [of expulsion of a foreigner for sufficient
cause] ... ."121
The Manitoba Court of Appeal gave a similar opinion: "The right of
expulsion of a foreign citizen whose presence is found to be objectionable
does not seem to be conditioned on the acquiescence of the country of
the foreign citizenship but apparently international comity requires that
communication take place. Such communication takes the form of pass-
port application."' 2
The opposite opinion was expressed in United States ex rel. Hudak v.
Ukl:2 3 .... the sovereign may deport the alien to the country of his
nativity and of which he is presumably a citizen .... Such power is
limited only by the power of the native sovereignty to refuse to receive
the alien if it so chooses. The power of the native sovereignty to refuse
to receive the alien is absolute in the absence of treaty otherwise pro-
viding."'2 4
During the Hague conference for the codification of international law
numerous delegations voiced their opinions on Basis of Discussion No.
2.1 5 Under this proposal there was no occasion to refer to the exact
issue of admission of nationals. The delegation of States opposed to
the adoption of Basis of Discussion No. 2, that is principally France,
Italy, and Roumania, stressed that the proposal would infringe on the
120.. Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1938-40, Case No. 144, at 393,
decision of Sept. 27, 1939.
121. Ibid.
122. In re Janoczka [1933] Man. CA. 1 D.L.R. 123, 128 (1932).
123. 20 F. Supp. 928 (ND. N.Y. 1937).
124. Id. at 929.
125. 24 Am. J. Int'l L. 10 (Supp. 1930).
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State's right to free itself of obnoxious persons, 20 an argument which
could, of course, apply to present nationals just as much as to former
nationals of the territorial State. But the remarks of these delegations
invite the inference that according to their opinion a person had to lose
his status as a national before his admission could be refused. However,
the point was not squarely raised, and if the prevailing opinion was as
indicated here, it found no definite formulation in the discussion.
The United States Department of State, in a communication directed
not to a foreign government, supported the view that a national must be
permitted to re-enter after a temporary visit abroad: ". . . the United
States might have sent him back to his own country, which would have
been under the necessity of receiving him or showing that he could not
be regarded as a citizen of Guatemalal'1 T
The immigration law of the United States seems to indicate the belief
of the United States government that the acceptance of a deportee can
freely be withheld by his national government: ". .. deportation of such
alien shall be directed to any country of which such alien is a subject
nationals, or citizen if such a country is willing to accept him in its
territory."'28
(2) Opinions of authors and criticism
The opinions expressed by authors on the subject have not developed
a uniform doctrine. A majority of authors have asserted the existence
of a customary rule of international law imposing the duty to receive
back nationals: "The duty to receive nationals cannot be disputed." " '
Castr~n is less positive in his expression. 80 Notwithstanding his some.
what hesitant language, Castr6n elaborates an almost gapless system at.
tributing to persons in every conceivable situation, as regards possessior
or lack of nationality, a State which is obligated to receive them if neec
be. Such system surely has its attractions; once the primary propositior
is established it is not without logic, the argument being that unilateral
action like deprivation of nationality cannot operate to relieve a State ol
international burdens.
126. Minutes of the First Committee, League of Nations, Acts of tho Conferenc(
for the Codification of International Law, held at the Hague from March 13 to Apri
12, 1930, II, League of Nations Publications V Legal, 1-15, at 37-42 (1930).
127. 3 Hackworth, op. cit. supra note 2, at 740.
128. U.S. Immigration Act § 243(a), 66 Stat. 212, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253(a) (1952).
129. Lessing, op. cit. supra note 50, at 117, 110, 139, 148, and authors cited by Lesslnj
in n. 2, at 119; Weis, Statelessness as a Legal-Political Problem, World Jewish Congrem
(British Section) 4 (1944); Bruckhardt, Organisation der Rechtsgemeinschaft. Unter
suchungen fiber die Eigenart des Privatrechts, des Staatsrechts und des Vblkerrechts 33!
(2d ed. 1944).
130. Castrin, op. cit. supra note 48, at 376.
[Vol. 24
DUTY TO RECEIVE NATIONALS
The primary assertion, however, is not undisputed: "Foreign countries
are not under any obligation to accept back their nationals.. 2131
The argument against the duty to receive back nationals is based on
the exclusive sovereignty of the territorial State to decide for itself whose
entry into the dominion it will permit. This is a petitio principii, as the
extent of sovereignty is the very question. But it obviously takes into
account the relative advantage held by the State insisting on the main-
tenance of the status quo.'
The opposite view is sometimes based on the premise that as a State
has a right to expel foreigners, there must be a corresponding duty on
some other state to receive such persons. This international duty, the
argument proceeds, must fall on the State to which the individual is
linked by the tie of nationality.' This argument is unacceptable, as
there is no conceptual difficulty in limiting a State's right of expulsion to
the situations in which another State is ready to receive the expellee, or
in letting the duty to receive the expelleees devolve upon a state other
than that of nationality.
Another argument in support of the duty to receive back could rest
on the principle of mutuality; from a State's right to extend diplomatic
protection to its nationals abroad it follows that a duty to receive back
must exist, for otherwise the State of sojourn might find no way of
ridding itself of individuals whose presence may result in diplomatic dis-
putes. The extreme case would be that of a State refusing to take back
persons on whose behalf numerous remonstrations and claims have been
diplomatically presented, while the national State at the same time re-
serves the right to continue its diplomatic protection over the same in-
dividuals.
The more normal case, it is safe to assume, is devoid of such seeming
hardship. A State will usually not have had occasion to intercede diplo-
matically on behalf of the deportee and will probably be willing to forego
future claims to protection after having rejected the demand for his
admission. But even under the hypothetical case the hardship to the
State of sojourn is serious only if its behavior has been illegal. The in-
conveniences arising from having to handle unmeritorious claims is a
general one and can be guarded against by means other than deporta-
tion.134
Another shortcoming of the argument under consideration is that the
131. Oppenheimer, The Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the United States,
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement 118, c. 2, 12(d) (1931).
132. See note 150 infra.
133. Feldman v. Justica Publica, Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases,
1938-40, Case No. 144, at 393, decision of Sept. 27, 1939.
134. E.g., compulsory arbitration with compensation of costs.
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right of diplomatic protection of nationals, and nationals only, may not
be as clearly established as has been supposed.135 This rule may well be
regarded as an extension of the treaty and adjudication practice of the
mixed arbitration commissions. 13 6 Such extension is unjustified as treaties
frequently provide otherwise. 37  Nor does this rule enjoy universal rec-
ognition. 38 But it must be conceded that after the announcement and
confirmation of the nationality of claims doctrine by the International
Court of Justice a change is quite improbable. 39 Nevertheless, this rule
should not serve as a doctrinal prop to a duty of admission because it is
unsatisfactory in its foundation, self-contradictory and logically un-
tenable in its application,'140 and regrettable in its results. 4 '
An argument has been made that "personal jurisdiction" exercised
over nationals is the basis of the duty to admit them: "Thus deportation
would appear to be an aspect of the exercise of sovereignty over absent
nationals.'1142 But surely the expulsion of a foreigner is not an act of the
alien's national sovereign but of the State of sojourn. If in the pre-
ceding quotation the word "deportation" were replaced by "duty to re-
ceive," which is probably what the author meant to say, it would still
be untenable; for sovereignty denotes the sphere of independence and
freedom of action allocated the States by international law. Con-
sequently it cannot embrace a restriction on that freedom. Somewhat
more in line with international law doctrine would be an argument that
personal jurisdiction carries with it as an ancillary duty the obligation
to receive nationals back. This argument is akin to the alleged correla-
tion of the right to protect and the duty to receive, and it is unconvincing
in part for the same reasons.
135. Particularly the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 76,
at 16 (1939); Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow (Merits), P.C.I.J., Ser. A. No.
17/13, at 27-28 (1928).
136. Sinclair, Nationality of Claims: British Practice, 27 British Y.B. Int'l L. 125, 128
(1950), dissent by Jonkheer van Eysinga, in the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case,
P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 76, at 34-35 (1939).
137. See German Hungarian Protocol of Aug. 8, 1940, 24 Zeitschrlft fur V6lkerrecht
567 (1941); Sinclair, op. cit. supra note 136, at 142.
138. Rule VI General Instructions for His Majesty's Foreign Service, quoted by Sin-
clair, op. cit. supra note 136, at 141; Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens
Abroad or The Law of International Claims 466 (1915); Joyce v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, [1946) A.C. 347 (H..); The Pellworm, [1922] 1 A.C. 292 (P.C.).
139. Although in the Bernadotte case exceptions were admitted to the rule of nationality
of claims, the rule itself was upheld [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174, at 181.
140. Dissent by Jonkheer van Eysinga, in the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case,
P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 76, at 35 (1939); Sinclair, op. cit. supra note 136, at 126.
141. Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. Rev. 438, 457 (1947);
Eagelton, The Responsibility of States in International Law 220-224 (1928).
142. Note, Aliens-Deportation-Deserting Seamen May Not Be Deported to Greek
Government-in-exile in England, 42 Col. L. Rev. 1343, 1345 (1942).
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Additionally the "personal jurisdiction" is a much more doubtful
proposition than the nationality of claims doctrine. Probably article 1
of the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Na-
tionality Laws, providing that "It is for each State to determine under
its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other
States... ,,4 is an attempt to give some kind of effect to personal juris-
diction. What exactly the recognition of foreign nationality which this
treaty exacts from States is to consist of remains obscure. It may not
mean more than that where a conflict of laws rule is predicated on the
nationality of the party the forum should apply the law of the foreign
State whose nationality is claimed, for the purpose of determining the
validity of the claim of nationality.
An extreme opinion holds that all States have to recognize all laws
made by the national State for the conduct of its nationals abroad."'
That this is not in keeping with general practice is initially brushed aside
as a factual and extra-legal considerations, but where the reconciliation
between territorial and personal jurisdiction is attempted the latter is
virtually eliminated. 45
That a State may enforce its own laws against an alien within its
territory in disregard of the law prescribed by the alien's sovereign is
not seriously disputed. Similarly, a State's legislation may be directed
to persons abroad other than its nationals. Enforcement, of course, de-
pends upon physical presence of the person or his property within the
State. Thus section 4, paragraph 3 Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6 of the German Crimi-
nal Code seeks to subject to German law various acts of foreigners done
outside the confines of Germany and irrespective of the legality of the
acts in the place where they are committed. The wording as well as a
comparison with section 6 of the Criminal Code indicates that section 4
is not to be restricted to acts or locations covered by international
treaties, nor has such a restrictive interpretation been advanced by
commentators' 4 Similarly, the United States has not always refrained
from enforcing her law against foreigners with respect to their foreign
conduct. The Supreme Court has held that a statute declaring it a mis-
demeanor to "make any charge" or to "take security" applies to acts
done abroad in conformity with the foreign law.'47 This was held not to
be either contrary to international law or a departure from the terri-
143. 24 Am. J. Int'l L. 192 (Supp. 1930).
144. Zitelmann, Internationals Privatrecht 89-90 (1897).
145. Id. at 98-99.
146. Sch6nke, op. cit. supra note 18, at 54-56; Reichsstrafgesetzbuch, Leipziger Kom-
mentar 76-79 (Jagsch 7th ed. 1953).
147. United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 223 U.S. 512 (1912).
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toriality of law principle. The reasoning employed to accomplish this
reconciliation was in effect that "to make" and "to take" are synonymous
with "having taken and retaining." The retaining occurring in the United
States was deemed to preserve the territoriality principle. This argu-
mentation could make many United States laws apply to aliens abroad
who later come under the physical power of the United States. The
territoriality principle is in effect abandoned as it merely obligates the
judge to go through one extra step of reasoning in converting the statu-
tory verb into participles.
Personal sovereignty is, therefore, a concept the validity of which is
open to serious challenge. 148 It should, not be made the basis of a duty
to admit.
Finally a kind of contractual theory is resorted to. Its basis is that a
State by international law is free to refuse entry to aliens notwithstand-
ing the national State's demands for entry. No State could introduce
its own nationals into the territory of another State without an exer-
cise of force within the foreign jurisdiction, thus committing an act il-
legal in times of peace. It can be argued that as the grant of privilege is
in the discretion of the territorial State, so is the determination of the
extent of the privilege. A State (B), in permitting a foreign national (of
A) to enter, reserves to itself the right to demand his departure. B in-
tends to grant only a temporary revocable permit.149 It must be observed
that this result is accomplished by B's unilateral action which trans-
forms what was originally a legal inability of A to get rid of a person
into a legal duty previously nonexistent to receive him back. Why B's
intention, even if declared, should effectuate such change without A's
consent remains obscure.
This objection can be overcome if the permission to emigrate given
by A to its national is to be regarded as an expression of assent to this
change. This first step in the analysis of the contractual theory shows,
without need for further elaboration, its inherent artificialities. A State
forbidding its nationals to emigrate, so that it certainly cannot be said to
have assumed the duty of receiving them back, would not thereby avoid
the operation of the rule based on nationality with respect to nationals
contravening this law. A State which does not prevent its nationals from
leaving the country and issues passports to them certainly does not think
of itself as entering into a treaty and assuming the duty to receive these
persons. A contractual theory should not be superimposed on fact situa-
tions which bear no vestige of an actual consensual element.
148. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflicts of Laws 71-89 (1942).
149. Lessing, op. cit. supra note 50, at 122; Castrn, op. cit. supra note 48, at 380.
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4. Conclusion Regarding the Present State of Law
The alleged duty to receive back nationals has no clear foundation in
international law. The presumption of international law is in favor of
the legality of State action, particularly when taken within the State
territory.150 In case of doubt, the exclusiveness of State control over its
territory prevails.151 It is proper to regard the exclusion of persons
from State territory as within the territorial sovereignty, limitations on
which have to be affirmatively established.
C. Is IT DEsRABLE To DEvELOP A RULE oF OBLIGATORY ADMISSION op
NATIONALS?
With a view to the progressive development of international law by
judicial legislation or future treaties, the duty to admit nationals into
State territory recommends itself primarily for its apparent simplicity.
But the opposite rule, that no State is bound to grant admission to any
person upon demand by another State, partakes of the same attraction.
The adoption of the duty to admit nationals would not dispose of the
problem of undeportable persons, unless accompanied by an international
restriction against the practice of depriving nationals of their status as
such, or obligating a State to receive back its former nationals, and by
a regulation concerning persons stateless ab initio. Problems of finding
out what State has to admit persons who were born, domiciled, or resi-
dent in territories ceded without treaty stipulation on this subject or on
the nationality question cannot be solved satisfactorily by resort to the
flat rule of a duty to admit nationals. This difficulty has caused authors
to suggest that here "inhabitants" become nationals of the new sovereign
not by virtue of the latter's laws but via international law.152 Where the
integration of the newly acquired land and its people into the life of
the new sovereign is avoided through expulsion of the inhabitants or
other measures, the application of a rule of automatic acquisition of na-
tionality is unsatisfactory.
150. Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits),
P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 7, at 30 (1926) concerning compliance with treaties; Case of the
S. "Lotus," P.C.IJ. Ser. A, No. 10/9, at IS (1927): a... a State ... may not exercise
its power in any form in the territory of another State."
151. The SS. "Wimjbledon," P.C.IJ. Ser. A, No. 1, at 24 (1923); Case of the Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, P.CI.J. Ser. A/B, No. 46, at 167 (1932);
Access to, or Anchorage in, the Port of Danzig of Polish War Vessels, P.C.IJ. Ser. A/B,
No. 43, at 142 (1931).
152. Makarov, Allgemeine Lehren des Staatsangeh6rigkeitsrechts 101-103 (194S). The
Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof of the Federal Republic of Germany has taken the vie%7
that international law lacks provisions granting the new soveregn's nationality to the
inhabitants of a ceded territory, Beschluss of May 28, 1952, Juristenzeitung p. 414 (19S2).
Also compare Castrin, op. cit. supra note 48, at 414.
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It is suggested that simplicity of a rule in any event, although it might
facilitate the work of the municipal administrative agency concerned, is
not a very strong argument for its adoption. International law tends to
develop away from broad generalization and to look into the interests
involved in a particular problem almost to the point of becoming atomis-
tic and evading prediction."'
The interests of States concerned with a given deportation case are,
of course, not necessarily tied up with the deportee's nationality. The
interests of the States which deserve consideration are so numerous
as to defy exhaustive enumeration. The duration of a person's stay in a
foreign State may well relieve other States of a duty to admit.1 4 Mili-
tary service, public employment, or other activity beneficial to the State
of sojourn 5  might prevent that State from claiming admission of the
person to any other State.
On the other hand, persons who have been granted entry to a country
as diplomatic or other representatives of their State of nationality or
residence must surely be taken back by the sending State. The same
would probably be true of persons admitted for temporary visits only.
But beyond these classes the area of doubt begins where the interests
have to be weighed in a case by case approach.
It may even be possible for international law to take into account the
interests of the individuals concerned. 1 The interest in the unity of a
family could be the basis of obligations on States to permit the departure
from the territory of dependent family members and to allow their entry
to the State in which the breadwinner resides.257
The Swedish delegate of the Hague Conference formulated his objec-
tion to the Basis of Discussion No. 2"11 in terms of humanitarian con-
siderations, when he said, "I will take as an example the case of a person
who has lived all his life in a foreign country and who has, so to speak,
given all his energy to that country. This person is quite assimilated to
the population of the country, and it would be an injustice to him when
153. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [19511 I.C.J. Rep. 116, at 133; Wal-
dock, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 28 British Y.B. Int'l L. 114, 169 (1951).
154. Castrn, op. cit. supra note 48, at 403-404, rejects this on the formal grounds that
international law lacks a statute of limitations; Lessing, op. cit. supra note 50, at 127-128,
opposes this as a non-legal consideration ("unjuristische Erwagnung").
155. The Supreme Penal Court of Switzerland overruled a motion for expulsion of a spy
inter alia on the grounds that he had performed services for the State, Roessler Case, Neuo
Ziiricher Zeitung, Nov. 5, 1953, No. 2609/1.
156. U.S. Immigration Act § 243(h), 66 Stat. 212, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253(h) (1952).
157. Lessing, op. cit. supra note 50, at 137. Contra, Castr6n, op. cit. supra note 48,
at 413.
158. 24 Am. J. Int'l L. 10 (Supp. 1930).
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he is no longer able to work to send him back to his country of
origin .... ))19
The inequity of a flat rule of admission of nationals is well stated
by Clark:16 0
"Aliens entering the United States as babies ... and in later life becoming prosti-
tutes, criminals, narcotic traffickers or anarchists, have become such, due in no small
measure to social conditions in the United States. Countries from which such persons
came many years ago feel it unjust to hold them responsible for what happens so
long after the arrival in the United States of one of their citizens . . . deportation
is 'passing the buck' and in itself no real solution... The day may arrive when the
individual will be regarded internationally and will be thought of as the product of
more than the country where he happens to have his legal citizenship and nation-
ality"161
In conclusion it may be submitted that general international law does
not obligate States to receive back their nationals from other countries,
and that the development of such an obligation is not desirable.
159. Minutes of the First Committee, supra note 126, at 41.
160. CLark, Deportation of Aliens from the United States to Europ.e (1931).
161. Id. at 484491.
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